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COURT REPORTS

rights without allowing Hage to divert water to another beneficial use,
therefore the court granted Hage the right to divert the water.
The court addressed the United States' argument that a United
States Forest Service ("USFS") manual determined the scope of rightof-way easements, and that a right-of-way of fifty feet exceeded the
necessary amount for reasonable maintenance. The court ruled that
the USFS manual lacked the force of law and constituted only
persuasive authority. In addition, the court found that the USFS
lacked the authority to adjudicate rights-of-way under the Act, since
that role was reserved for the judiciary. Finally, the court found that
legislative intent, and common sense, supported a fifty-foot right-ofway to allow access to the ditches for maintenance.
The court next addressed Hage's claim regarding the grazing
permit. The court held that the Taylor Grazing Act and several cases
hold that permits are only a license to use the land for grazing, not an
absolute right, and that the Secretary of the Interior may cancel or
modify permits. Therefore, Hage possessed no property interest in the
grazing permit, and no compensable right existed.
Finally, the court addressed Hage's claim to a 752,000-acre surface
estate for grazing originating under the Ordinance of May 20, 1785;
Kearney's Code and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo; the Act of 1866;
the Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the subsequent Acts of 1888 and
1890; the Creative Act of 1891; the Forest Service Organic
Administration Act; the Livestock Reservoir Siting Act; the Stock
Raising Homestead Act; the Taylor Grazing Act; and Nevada's Three
Mile Grazing Rule. The court found that legislative intent behind
these statutes did not support granting Hage a large surface estate
under these acts, and that at most Hage could go on the land to access
water in which he owned a vested right.
JaredEllis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
City of Olmstead Falls v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (holding the sovereign immunity
waiver in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision does not apply if
the citizen fails to provide notice prior to filing suit; the sovereign
immunity waiver in the federal facilities pollution control provision
does not apply when there is no allegation of a federal facility
engaging in polluting; the Administrative Procedure Act's sovereign
immunity waiver does not apply to discretionary actions; and the
mandamus statute does not apply to allegations of failure to perform
discretionary duties).
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The City of Olmstead Falls and a city resident ("Olmstead Falls")
alleged the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
the Department of the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), and
various other federal and state entities and officials violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") by failing to revoke a "dredge or fill" permit issued
to the nearby City of Cleveland for an airport construction project.
The Corps issued the permit to Cleveland following a waiver of
authority by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("OEPA") to
act on the permit application. Olmstead Falls appealed the waiver to
the Ohio Environmental Review Appeals Commission, which ruled
that Ohio law did not permit such a waiver. Olmstead Falls requested
that the Corps and the EPA revoke the permit due to the invalidity of
Cleveland's application. The federal agencies refused. Olmstead Falls
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio against the EPA, the Corps, and various other federal and state
entities and officials. The government agencies moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the argument that the
federal question statute, the federal mandamus statute, and the
Declaratory Judgment Act did not contain statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity, and the CWA and the Administrative Procedure
Act contained statutory waivers of immunity that were inapplicable to
this case. After considering the necessary facts and allegations, the
court granted the motion to dismiss.
The court first reviewed the waiver of immunity contained in the
citizen suit provision of the CWA. The court found that Olmstead
Falls failed to provide the EPA with the statutory sixty days notice of
intent to file suit regarding the disputed permit. This prevented the
waiver of sovereign immunity on the part of the Corps and the EPA
and therefore stripped the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court then reviewed the waiver of sovereign immunity stated in the
federal facilities pollution control provision and found that it provided
a waiver of immunity only with respect to actions in which the
government is the alleged polluter. Thus, the court held that there
was no waiver of immunity and that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Corps and the EPA under the CWA provisions.
Next, the court reviewed the general waiver of immunity included
in the APA. The court found that the APA granted courts jurisdiction
to review the actions taken by an agency of the federal government
except when the action is discretionary by law. Accordingly, the court
examined Olmstead Falls' complaint to find if it challenged a
nondiscretionary act on the part of the Corps and the EPA. The court
found that Olmstead Falls' complaint did not challenge the issuing of
the permit to the City of Cleveland, but rather the Corps' and EPA's
failure to revoke the permit once they knew Cleveland's application to
be invalid. Because the court found that the agencies' decision not to
revoke the permit was discretionary, it held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to review the action under the APA.
Finally, the court addressed the waiver of sovereign immunity
contained in the federal mandamus statute. It found that in order for
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the mandamus jurisdiction to lie, plaintiffs must show the defendant
violated a clear, nondiscretionary duty owed to plaintiffs. Because the
court evaluated the actions of the Corps and the EPA and concluded
that their failure to revoke the "dredge or fill" permit issued to the City
of Cleveland was discretionary, the court held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Olmstead Falls' mandamus claim against the
Corps and the EPA.
For the reasons set forth, the court found that there was no waiver
of sovereign immunity on the part of the Corps or the EPA and that
the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Olmstead
Falls' claims against the government agencies.
Mark Shea

Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment disallows monetary damages against officials
acting in their official capacity; the right to seek redress via federal
statutory authority for a violation of independently existing
constitutional rights exists even if the same set of facts also give rise to
a cause of action for a violation of statutory rights; a regulation goes
"too far" if it deprives the individual of all economically beneficial use
of his or her property and it does not substantially advance state
interests; a regulatory taking may occur if state officials ignore their
statutory and regulatory obligations; a specific Fifth Amendment
takings cause of action subsumes a more general Fourteenth
Amendment takings cause of action; and notice of conduct potentially
in violation of the Constitution prevents the qualified immunity
defense).
Edward Swartz ("Swartz") owned and operated a 280-acre ranch in
Campbell County, Wyoming. Swartz filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming against Gary Beach and
Dennis Hemmer ("Officials") individually and in their official
capacities as Administrator and Director respectively of the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality Division
("WDEQ"). Swartz also named as a defendant Redstone Resources,
Inc. ("RRI"), a Colorado corporation, who operated a gas company
producing coal bed methane ("CBM") in the Powder River Basin of
Wyoming. Swartz's suit alleged the taking of private property without
just compensation or due process by the Officials' failure to perform
statutory and regulatory duties without due process. Furthermore,
Swartz sought to enjoin defendants from allowing discharge of
contaminated water in violation of his constitutional rights and federal
and state environmental laws.
The Officials and RRI filed
independent motions to dismiss the compliant. The court granted the
Officials' motion to dismiss to the extent the complaint sought
monetary damages against the Officials acting in their official capacity

